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A Covert Channel in RTP Protocol
Christopher Forbes, Bo Yuan, Daryl Johnson, and Peter Lutz
Department of Networking, Security, and Systems Administration
B. Thomas Golisano College of Computing and Information Sciences
Rochester Institute of Technology
Rochester, New York, 14623, USA
{crf6296, bo.yuan, daryl.johnson, peter.lutz}@rit.edu
A new covert channel over the RTP protocol is designed and implemented by
modifying the timestamp value in the RTP header. Due to the high frequency
of RTP packets, the covert channel has a high bit-rate, theoretically up to
350 bps. The broad use of RTP for multimedia applications such as VoIP,
provides abundant opportunities to such a covert channel to exist. By using
the RTP header, many of the challenges present for covert channels using the
RTP payload are avoided. A reference implementation of this covert channel
is presented. Bit-rates of up to 325 bps were observed. The channel is very
diﬃcult to detect due to expected variations in the timestamp ﬁeld and the
ﬂexible nature of RTP.
Keywords: Covert channels; RTP protocol, bit-rate.

1. Introduction
Several VoIP based covert channels have been proposed. Druid2 designed
and implemented ”SteganRTP” which uses steganography techniques to
embed secret messages in the payload of RTP packets. In order to increase
the reliability of the covert channel, Druid2 designed a minimalistic protocol within the covert channel that contains ﬁelds such as checksum, type,
length, and sequence ﬁelds. The design was eﬀective to mitigate the reliability issue, though potentially costly in a low bandwidth channel.
Tian et al4 seek to provide a real time steganography design that resists
detection. They make use of the G.729 codec as a cover medium and established an m-sequence technique to hide the data. A RSA-like key exchange
provides for synchronization between the two endpoints. The authors found
that their techniques provided good security for transmitting covert data
while maintaining the real time requirements of VoIP.
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Mazurczyk and Kotulski5 seek to exchange information over VoIP using digital watermarking and steganography techniques to provide a covert
channel. Watermarks and steganographic data are embedded to provide for
authentication and integrity of the VoIP stream. Control ﬁelds were embedded into the existing protocol headers, while the data were embedded
within the voice stream.
Mazurczyk et al6 compares steganographic techniques that can be used
to introduce covert channels within VoIP. The primary method introduced
makes use of both timing delays and modifying packet contents for a hybrid
channel. The idea is to use excessively delayed packets that are discarded
to carry a load of covert data.
Except Mazurczyk and Kotulski,5 who embedded control ﬁeld in protocol headers, all RTP based on covert channels reviewed so far are based on
embedding covert data in payload of protocols. While the payload provides
a potentially large bandwidth for covert channel, it also has limitations,
including changes in codec rendering the channel unusable.
In this paper, a covert channel is devised based on ﬁelds in the RTP
header only. It utilizes the least signiﬁcant bits of the timestamp in the
protocol header to deliver covert message rather than delivering it in the
payload. By using the protocol header, the channel provides for broad applicability by ignoring many of the codec issues encountered in the payload.
A sample implementation of the covert channel is also presented. Experimental results have shown that the covert channel is reliable.
2. Covert communications in RTP timestamp
The proposed new covert channel is to modify the timestamp ﬁeld in the
RTP header to transmit data. For a regular voice stream sampled at 8000
Hz using G.711, for example, the timestamp is incremented by a value of
160 in each packet rather than incrementing by the actual time passed.
The numbering of the timestamps needs only to be in proper sequence to
function properly at the receiving end.
A timestamp was ﬁrst employed to carry covert data in TCP protocol.7
This channel carried 1 bit in the least signiﬁcant bit of the TCP timestamp
by delaying the packet creation. In TCP, the timestamp is only an option,
making it easier to detect if a system does not usually use the option. In
contrast, RTP makes use of the timestamp in every packet.
In this research, the G.711 codec was chosen as the reference point due
to its standardized nature, high quality performance, and common usage
in VoIP communications. G.711 provides a high quality communications
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channel, using pulse code modulation at 8,000 Hz with 8 bits per sample
for a 64 Kbit/s bit rate.8
Data can easily be embedded into the last seven bits based on standard
VoIP sampling rate of 8 kHz without disturbing transmission. Seven bits
cover a range of 128 (0-127) in decimal, which is still below the value of
160 used for incrementing the timestamp. With 50 packets transmitted per
second, this provides a gross data rate of 350 bits per second full duplex,
with less available dependent on network conditions, reliability protocols
implemented, and needed level of covertness.

3. Characteristics of the Covert Channel
3.1. Covertness
This implementation is diﬃcult to detect provided the channel is not already known. The timestamp ﬁeld is expected by most to contain actual
timestamp values, which may contain some variability. In addition, it is
possible for RTP streams to be reset during a call, resulting in the timestamp to be reset to a new start time. Current detection of covert channels
based on RTP focuses on the payload manipulation, which is left untouched
for this channel.
The varying timestamps by codec makes it very diﬃcult to detect manipulation of the timestamp. Since even a single application (VoIP) makes
use of a wide range of codecs, simply detecting that timestamps are not incrementing at a certain rate is not easily accomplished. Additionally, newer
codecs, such as speex, do not even have an assigned number for RTP payloads, further complicating detection.
Another diﬃculty in detecting the RTP timestamp is the underlying use
of UDP, as UDP is not reliable and may lose packets in transit. It can also
be diﬃcult to detect that RTP is in use, as UDP does not specify what kind
of data is in its payload and RTP does not need to use a standard port.
The ease of detecting the channel also depends upon how much data is
being transferred. The more data that is transferred, the more irregular the
timestamp may appear. Slowing the amount of data sent per packet, such as
two bits instead of seven, also notably increases covertness of the channel.
Use of a man-in-the-middle technique can also increase covertness, as the
RTP timestamps can be returned to their original values before reaching
the end user.
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3.2. Reliability
The channel is not particularly robust without further mechanisms being
used to make it a reliable carrier. This is because it is carried over a UDP
carrier, as opposed to a reliable carrier such as TCP. As such, part of
the available bandwidth can be dedicated to a minimalistic protocol to
improve the reliability and integrity of the messages. However, given the
limited bandwidth available, the channel may still experience reliability
issues when faced with a highly disruptive channel.
3.3. Bandwidth
The bandwidth of the channel is up to 7 bits per packet by 50 packets a
second, for a total of 350 bits per second. This max rate can be closely
realized using the full 7 bits of covert data on a well-functioning network.
The speed from the channel is suﬃcient for text based communications and
small ﬁle transfer, among other applications. Distance will not decrease the
speed of the transmission, as it is essentially two unidirectional streams.
4. Reference implementation
The reference implementation of this covert channel was built upon the
sample implementation provided by pjsip.org.9 The application, pjsua, provides a basic SIP client based upon libraries from the PJSIP open source
project.
While many modules are used in placing calls, the only parts involved
in the covert channel are rtp.c and rtp.h. Accordingly, the vast majority
of the application is not even aware of the timestamp modiﬁcation. To
further conceal the presence of the covert channel, the covert channel data
is removed from the timestamp by rtp.c before heading to the rest of the
application. By doing so, the modiﬁcations made by the covert channel are
seen by as little of the application as possible, and do not interfere with the
jitter buﬀer or other components.
5. Experimental results
The experimental results were collected running two instances of the client,
one running on Windows Vista SP2 and the second on a Windows XP SP3.
Data was captured using Wireshark for analysis. Unless otherwise noted,
the G.711 codec was used for the RTP payload with a sampling rate of 8000
Hz.
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For NY to IL tests, both machines were behind home routers using
NAT, and connected to the Internet using cable modems. Both computers
were connected to the LAN via 802.11G wireless networking. This wireless
networking provided another source of potential interference for these tests,
as multiple computers were using the shared wireless medium at both ends.
For the tests, the standard ﬁle used was a 1024 character block of ASCII
text using Windows line endings. This ﬁle was transmitted in full duplex.
In addition to the standard 1024 character ﬁle, a 300 KB ﬁle was also
transmitted on some local tests to check for the ability to send large ﬁles.
Data was transmitted without an additional reliability protocol at 7 bits
per packet (7-bit) and 2 bits per packet (2-bit).
5.1. Bandwidth

Fig. 1.

Speed of the data transfer with various modes of the reference implementation.

The speed of the application when running in the 7-bit mode was close
to the expected theoretical maximum. In tests, both local and long distance
from NY to IL, the speed transmission speed was 325 bps, compared to the
theoretical maximum of 350 bps as illustrated in Fig. 1. The 2-bit mode
similarly came close to its theoretical maximum, averaging 92 bps out of a
theoretical 100. It is not entirely clear what caused this slight discrepancy
though it not surprising that it does not exactly match the theoretical rate.
A minor diﬀerence in the timing of the packets could easily cause such a
drop in rate.
5.2. Reliability
Reliable transfers with no errors were repeatedly obtained over both the
local network and across the public Internet. The client transmitted ﬂaw-
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lessly on all local and remote tests, even from NY to IL. The client also
performed ﬂawlessly on a local 300 KB test ﬁle. This persistence of the data
indicates a quality Internet infrastructure and that most calls could use the
client without additional reliability provisions.
5.3. Covertness
Overall the channel exhibited a high degree of covertness, making it difﬁcult to detect. This was mainly due to the ﬂexible nature of the RTP
protocol and operation of the RTP timestamp. Even with knowledge of
the covert channel, one must ﬁrst ﬁnd a data bearing packet, then determine the expected timestamp value, before being able to decode the covert
data. Firewalls inspecting only layers one through four are unable to block
the channel; only application layer ﬁrewalls with speciﬁc knowledge of the
covert channel can detect it, and even then face signiﬁcant diﬃculties.
The jitter experienced with the rapid rate of packets also leads to detection problems. Data on the wire may not arrive in the order it was sent
due to the use of a UDP transport. To eﬀectively process this data while
looking for the channel, one needs a jitter buﬀer and to arrange packets
based on sequence numbers.
Mathematically the channel is hard to detect since the RTP timestamp
ﬁeld need not follow any particular pattern. The RTP timestamp increment
changes depending on protocol used for the RTP payload at that point
in time, and may use system clock time. Additionally, the fact that the
timestamp may not increment between packets further complicates analysis,
and could make it easy to get false positives.

Fig. 2.

Entropy of the timestamp ﬁeld.

Fig. 2 shows entropies of the timestamp increment for G.711, for each
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of the diﬀerent modes. 2-bit mode with no reliability protocol is the most
covert. 1024 characters were sent on the covert channel out of 10,000 RTP
packets for the calculations in Fig. 2.
6. Conclusion
We have shown the ability to transmit and receive data using a new covert
channel over RTP, without interrupting the reception of the voice stream.
The reference implementation shows that this covert channel can be practically implemented and used. Speed was shown to be suﬃcient for twoway text based communications and small ﬁle transfer. Reliability was also
shown to be good, if not always perfect. The ability to detect this channel
was also seen to be diﬃcult, given the many packets involved and the way
RTP operates. Future work will further develop this reference implementation with increased reliability, ﬂexibility, and usability.
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